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While xenophobic sentiments are always present in a society1
Whom is xenophobia directed against? How are migrant-phobias related to xenophobia? What are 
the hidden underlying factors behind the rise of xenophobia and the aggression towards the “others”? 
Is there a connection between the prevalence of xenophobia and the functioning of social institutions 
and social setting? 
, they have become widespread in the 
2000s. In 2002-2012, the share of respondents who do not feel hostility towards representatives of 
other nationalities decreased by over a quarter. The slogan "Russia for the Russians", which is 
supported not only by the Russians, but also by the representatives of the traditional minorities within 
Russia, has been increasingly popular in the 2000s. In November 2012, only 23% of the respondents 
reacted negatively to it, considering it properly fascist - as opposed to 30% in 1998 (Levada Centre in 
2012a, p.176, 179). 
Xenophobia: the objects and the discourse 
Xenophobia in Russia has several dimensions, of which the most important are: ethnic (ethno-phobia), 
migration (migrant-phobia), religious (Islam-phobia, first and foremost), and according to citizenship 
(presence / absence of the Russian citizenship)2
The factor of being “an alien” and “an outsider” is, apparently, no less important than the factor of 
ethnicity: ethnic minorities that are traditional for a particular locality are most often perceived as 
“inner minorities”, “insiders”, “our own”. Being an alien, intersected with being an ethnic minority, 
aggravates anti-immigrant sentiments. As the host population is faced mainly with migrants of other 
ethnicity, migrant-phobias have a clear ethnic aetiology.  
. The exaggerated importance of ethnicity permeates 
many aspects of public debate regarding socio-economic and political life, and the discussion of social 
problems is often unjustly transposed into the ethnic dimension. 
The situation is further complicated when ethnic migrants belong to a religious group whose 
religion is not shared by the majority, and who do not have Russian citizenship. Central Asian 
migrants, persons from Azerbaijan, thus belong to the most vulnerable groups of migrants in the 
majority of Russian regions. 
This is partly true: the Russians are relatively tolerant mainly towards newcomers from Ukraine, 
Moldova, Belarus, that is, those groups that do not visually stand out in the host community. Irritation, 
hostility, and distrust are dominant attitudes towards the other ethnic groups amongst the respondents. 
The attitude towards the above listed ethnic groups remained unchanged for many years, or 
changed slightly (Mukomel, 2005, pp. 69, 77; Mukomel, 2011, p.37). The internal migrants from the 
North Caucasus constitute an exception: the growth of xenophobia towards them is beyond any doubt. 
After the events at the Manezhnaya Square, the support of the slogan “Stop feeding the Caucasus” 
does not fall below 57%, and in November 2012, the slogan received the support of 65% of the 
respondents (Levada Centre 2012 a, p.179). 
The growth of xenophobia in the 1990s can be explained, firstly, by a traumatic shock caused by 
the fundamental socio-political and economic transformation of the Russian society, and, secondly, by 
the elimination of the law-enforcement agencies. 
As a result of adaptation of the Russians to the new realities, the phobias of losing resources, 
typical of the 1990s, have nearly disappeared - at least from the public debate (except for the fear of 
competition on the labour market and wages dumping), equally common back in the days as phobias 
                                                     
1 The recognition of presence of xenophobia in the society does not imply an unquestionably negative evaluation of the state 
of society. The problem is the degree of xenophobic sentiments, and the extent to which they threaten social stability. 
2 At present, in addition to traditional phobias, a tendency to an increased homophobia can be noted. 
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of identity loss (Levada 2000, p.433). Phobias of identity loss have intensified; however, the focus of 
the discourse has changed: the mass-media and the public politicians prefer to appeal to the “cultural 
matrix”, “cultural code”, “cultural ties”, etc. In the meantime, culture is understood as ethnically 
immanent, although “the idea of the innate culture, national character, and the like has either been 
completely discredited, or filed with modern sociology" (Sztompka, 2012, p.243). “Cultural racism”, 
which replaces the hierarchy of racial biological racism with the idea of the incompatibility of 
“cultures” and the danger of mixing them, is now more common than the “classical” racism (Osipov, 
2010, p.15). 
B. Parekh captures a flaw in this discourse when it is applied to migrants: one should not think that 
a society that has been homogeneous before immigration will become homogenous after the 
immigration stops. Since the immigrants belong to different religious, ethnic or other groups, it is 
difficult to ignore the differences in their expectations, cultural resources and ways of interaction with 
the society. Diversity that emerged as a result of immigration is not necessarily deeper and more 
intense than the diversity that exists in the host societies, with their immanently different views on 
homosexuality, gay marriage, cohabitation, relationships between parents and children, family 
discipline, the capitalist economy, respect for law. Immigrants are more conservative in their 
approaches to nearly all these issues than the majority of the host community members; moral and 
cultural barriers between them and the society are thinner than between the members of the host 
society (Parekh 2008, p.81). 
While the increased scale of migration and its structural transformation have both played some role 
in the growth of xenophobia and the reorientation of radical nationalists to fight the influx of 
ethnically different migrants (Byzov, 2012, p.162), a certain political anti-migration philosophy, based 
on racial-ethnic arguments and images, has been formed already at the end of the last century 
(Zinchenko, Loginov 2011, p.570). 
The growth of xenophobia in its various manifestations in the 2000s may have been due not only to 
external factors, but also to deep, fundamental factors of transformation and the functioning of the 
Russian society. 
Xenophobia and the Russian society in the context of a culture of trust 
A quest for the transformation of social and political institutions has not been formed today. 
First of all, the Russians are not satisfied with the growing social inequality, particularly, income 
inequality: from 0,387 in 1995, the Gini coefficient rose to 0,397 in 2001, and reached 0,420 in 2012 
(Rosstat 2013). 
Selective justice, social inequalities in education, health care, lack of social mobility for young 
people, a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the authorities, etc. aggravate the feeling of dissatisfaction with 
everyday life. Russia is placed in the second hundred of countries according to the subjective 
assessment of life satisfaction of its citizens (experienced well-being) (HPI 2012, p.25). 
Social inequality breeds discontent: “with the illegitimacy of such [social – V.M.] inequalities in 
public consciousness, they have a major destabilizing impact on the Russian society and the growth of 
social contradictions within” (Gorshkov 2010, p.3). 
It was noted back in the 1990's: “within the Russian society, the level of mutual trust is low; 
typical are: mutual indifference, lack of reciprocal (i.e., based on the mutual responsible) behaviour 
and its limitations to the circle of family and friends; the sense of duty is limited to the family circle” 
(Diligensky 1998, p. 230). Low levels of interpersonal trust and confidence in social institutions was 
recorded in the 2000s by sociological centres and specialists [FOM 2008a, FOM 2008b; Sasaki, Latov, 
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etc. 2010; Golenkova, Ighithanyan 2012, p.198-199]. Particularly alarming is the fact that throughout 
the years 2004-2012 the faith into people weakened.3
Interpersonal distrust affects, first of all, direct interpersonal contacts with specific 
representatives of minorities (ethnic, migrant, religious, etc.). 
 
Another, broader confidence circle encompasses a wide range of categories of people, united 
into imagined communities: ethnic groups, religions, races, etc. In this case, trust towards specific 
persons is transferred into trust towards more abstract public objects. This form of trust is often based 
on stereotypes and prejudices. As the impulse of trust applies only towards persons, “in order to 
discontinue it, it is enough to dehumanize, objectify the recipient of trust, deprive him of his human 
traits: personality, self / approval, dignity, autonomy” (Sztompka 2012, p.117, 157-158). Distrust 
based on depersonalization provokes xenophobia towards all members of the imagined community. 
Institutional trust constitutes a separate problem. In Russia, 44% of citizens state that they trust 
political institutions. This percentage is significantly lower than the OECD average, which is 56% 
(OECD 2013). 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the level of confidence towards state institutions (parliament, 
regional and local authorities, political parties, police, courts) is consistently low (Levada Centre 2012 
b). The level of confidence has been steadily declining since 2008 (Golenkova, Ighithanyan 2012, 
p.276-277). 
The society is experiencing an erosion of culture of trust, accompanied by the expansion of 
cultural of distrust, which is characterized by anomie, instability of public order, the opacity of the 
institutions, estrangement of the surrounding communities, irresponsibility of other people and 
institutions (Sztompka 2012, p. 300 - 305, 414). The social and political structure of modern-day 
Russia plays a role in this erosion of culture of trust. The alignment of the vertical of power and its 
centralization reduces the need of the authorities in trust of the citizens: “in case of complete control 
over a certain phenomena, trust naturally does not matter” (Sztompka 2012, p. 71, p. 379). 
The development of the culture of mistrust is associated with a low level of loyalty and 
solidarity: the growth of dissatisfaction with the current situation in the country in all social groups 
(Levada Centre 2012a, p.22), along with the violation of basic principles of justice, a sense of 
“wrongness” of what is happening, “leads to an increase in atomization that destroys the experienced 
sense of organic community of the nation and, as a result, the foundations of social solidarity of the 
Russians” (Tikhonov 2013, p.289). This undermines the fundamental values of the Russians. 
Russian culture (according to G. Hofstede) is a collectivist culture with a high level of 
uncertainty avoidance (which is reflected in a high level of anxiety and a tendency to “release energy” 
and aggressive behaviour), with a high level of distance vis-à-vis the authority. According to R. 
Inglehart, “traditional values” prevail within (high importance of family, respect for the authorities and 
religion, combined with social conformism, openness towards nationalist views) and the value of 
“survival”, which is characterized by high importance of safety, a sense of threat from the aliens, 
members of other ethnic groups, persons of different cultures. Values of belonging to a community 
and “hierarchy” are explicitly present in the Russian culture (Lebedeva 2011). 
Half of Russian respondents are oriented towards obedience; their focus on the independent 
social action is weak. They are characterized by assigning high importance to the hierarchical 
relationships in the society, obtaining and executing signals “from above” and the authorities, 
particularly toward those of lower standing within the status hierarchy. Distrust towards the others is 
accompanied by an increased trust to the government figures. The alternative values of the initiative 
autonomy prevail only amongst 3% of the Russian respondents. 46% of the respondents embrace 
intermediate values (Magoon, Rudnev 2013). 
 Dissatisfaction with the principles of distribution and social injustice amongst the Russians 
undermines the confidence and trust in fundamental values, and are fraught with doubts about the 
legitimacy of the existing order. The authorities are conscious of the danger of the erosion of 
                                                     
3 During these years, the Levada Center annually asked a question: «How has your faith into people changed over the year?». 
The number of persons who replied that it has weakened was 2.5 times greater than the number of persons who replied 
that it has grown stronger (Calculated by: Levada Center 2012 a, p.8).  
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traditional values and the destabilization of the foundations of the culture, in the first place – respect 
for the authorities, loyalty, and recognition of the legitimacy of the established order. 
The solution is sought, firstly, in the use of traditional values of “order” 4
Ethnic solidarity occupies an unsuitably significant place in the range of other group solidarities. 
Although ethnic solidarity may directly correlate with the civil one (Drobizheva, Ryzhova 2010), 
sociologists have noted that solidarization is to a large extent based on a feeling of hurt, especially 
amongst the Russians (Drobizheva 2013, p.244). 
 and the appeal to 
“stability”. Secondly, it is sought through the termination of various forms of uncontrolled initiative 
and solidarity coming from below. Thirdly, it is sought through reformatting of solidarities. However, 
in all variants of this construction of “new solidarity”, the potential targets of xenophobia (ethnic, 
migrant and religious minorities, foreigners) are a priori “strangers.” 
In the 2000s, 15-18% of the respondents noted the growth of aggressiveness and anger (Levada-
Zentr 2012a, p.16). The Russian society is still a mobilization type of society, and a climate of 
constant “struggle” is prerequisite for the mobilization conditions (Levada, 2001, p.13). In the early 
2000s, it was suggested that the only mobilizing resource is the exploitation of the wounded national 
pride of the Russian people (Pain 2004, p.234). The mastering of the technology of “new solidarities”, 
accompanied by a constant search for and discovery of new objects of xenophobia, the “new 
outsiders”5
The transfer of differences in the interests of social groups into the political arena, and some 
groups opposing other groups, is not harmless. A search for ruptures, on the one hand, solves tactical 
problems thereby hampering the formation of opposition coalitions; on the other hand, it leads to a 
segmentation of the society, rather than its consolidation. 
, significantly expanded the resources of mobilization. 
Xenophobia and migrant-phobias expand not only due to the expansion of the mobilization base, 
but also due to the activation of ethnic entrepreneurs. According to V.A. Tishkov, the discourse of 
“racism” includes not only everyday racism, but also political racism based on party ideology and 
reflected both in the party programs6
Changes within public consciousness and institutional framework are a difficult enduring 
process. In the meantime, the country faces serious challenges. A subtle and transparent policy of 
combating intolerance is necessary. Such policy must include an adoption of a state program and the 
establishment of public control over the functioning of social and political institutions to counteract 
xenophobia. Only in case of adoption of such policy an effective barrier to the escalation of 
xenophobia can be created. 
 and in the practical activity, institutional racism, which is 
immanent to such social institutions as the army, school, health care, social assistance, religious 
organizations, and state racism, which is reflected in the legislation and practices (Zinchenko, 
Loginova 2011, p.571). 
Of particular importance are the tools to reconcile the interests of different social and political 
groups. If xenophobic sentiments are present in the society, they should be detected. A dialogue is 
necessary, as well as “the search for meanings” (Sztompka, 2012, p.327). Furthermore, institutional 
reforms are necessary. Otherwise, xenophobia will remain not only a product, but also an instrument 
of the Russian society’s functioning. 
 
                                                     
4 While ignoring other values, particularly, «justice». In the conditions of the growing social inequality, a quest for «justice» 
leads to frustration and increasingly aggressive attitudes. 
5 In the meantime, the titles of the created pro-government movements are based on militaristic vocabulary ("Front", 
"Defense" (“Oborona”)), on a single-meaning ("Ours" (“Nashi”), "Locals" (“Mestnye”)), or associative identification 
("Steel" (“Stal’”), "Marching Together" (“Iduschie vmeste”)). 
6 The programs of all parliamentary parties, with the exception of the "United Russia", contain xenophobic views 
(Mukomel 2012). 
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